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I. INTRODUCTION 
When a public company agrees to enter into a business combination 
transaction with another entity, the provisions contained in the agreement 
between the parties are designed: (1) to express the economic terms of 
the transaction; (2) to set forth the mechanics of the transaction, as 
mandated by, or included in response to, applicable law; (3) to create 
affirmative duties of each party to the other or, in certain cases, to 
specified third party beneficiaries of the agreement; and (4) to allocate 
risk between the parties as to various post-signing events or changes. 
This Article discusses, from the point of view of a "selling" company, 
issues raised by the latter two types of provisions. 1 In particular, Part V 
of this Article considers certain "deal protection" provisions, such as 
"no-shops," "break-up fees," and "lock-ups," that may be included in a 
business combination agreement at the buyer's request in order to reduce 
the likelihood of a third party interfering with the contemplated 
transaction. Under certain circumstances, the fiduciary duties of the 
I. Except where important to the understanding of specific legal doctrines 
discussed in this outline, the terms "seller" and "buyer" and their respective variants are 
used colloquially to refer to the roles the parties choose. 
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board of directors of a selling company limit the availability of such 
protections. Accordingly, before discussing specific "deal protection" 
mechanisms, Parts II through IV of this Article review certain lines of 
cases decided by the Delaware courts regarding the fiduciary duties of 
the directors of Delaware corporations. Parts II through V also 
summarize the guidance provided by such cases with respect to 
structuring the process of investigation and decision making by the 
seller's board. The Article concludes, in Part VI, with a discussion of 
selected provisions of a business combination agreement that raise 
important issues with respect to risk allocation between the parties. 
IL THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
The business judgment rule reflects the traditional reluctance of the 
courts to second-guess business decisions made in good faith by 
unconflicted directors. The rule establishes, for purposes of litigation, 
a rebuttable presumption that directors acted in good faith and used 
appropriate decision-making procedures. In Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicol-
or, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court noted that the business judgment 
rule "operates as both a procedural guide for litigants and a substantive 
rule of law."2 The Technicolor court continued: 
As a procedural guide the business judgment presumption is a rule of evidence 
that places the initial burden of proof on the plaintiff. In Cede Il, this Court 
described the rule's evidentiary, or procedural, operation as follows: 
If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this evidentiary burden, the 
business-judgment rule attaches to protect corporate officers and directors 
and the decisions they make, and our courts will not second-guess these 
business judgments. If the rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the 
defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove 
to the trier of fact the "entire fairness" of the transaction to the sharehold-
er plaintiff. 
Burden shifting does not create per se liability on the part of the directors. 
Rather, it "is a procedure by which the Delaware courts of equity determine 
under what standard of review director liability is to be judged. "3 
"From a procedural perspective, the breach of any one of the board's 
fiduciary duties is enough to shift the burden of proof to the board to 
2. 663 A.2d I 156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (referred to by the Delaware Courts as Cede II), modified 
on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994)). 
3. Id. at 1162 (quoting Cede, 634 A.2d at 361, 371) (citations omitted). 
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demonstrate entire faimess.',4 As a substantive rule of law, the business 
judgment rule provides the applicable standard of review of board 
decisions made in accordance with the directors' fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty. The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that: 
[I]n cases where the traditional business judgment rule is applicable ... the 
Court gives great deference to the substance of the directors' decision and will 
not invalidate the decision, will not examine its reasonableness, and "will not 
substitute [its] views for those of the board if the latter's decision can be 
'attributed to any rational business purpose. "'5 
A. The Duty of Care 
The duty of care requires directors to use appropriate decision-making 
procedures. Directors satisfy this requirement principally by informing 
themselves "prior to making a business decision, of all material 
information reasonably available to them.',6 Under Delaware law, the 
standard under which a board's duty of care toward shareholders is 
measured is that of gross negligence.7 If a plaintiff proves that a board 
was grossly negligent in the exercise of its duties, then the board is 
deemed not to have met its duty of care.8 
In Van Gorkom, for example, the board of directors of the Trans 
Union Corporation approved a merger agreement after a twenty-minute 
oral presentation by the Chairman of the Board, who failed to explain 
the methodology behind determining the merger consideration. The 
board did not read the merger agreement, which arrived at the meeting 
too late for review.9 The Van Gorkom court found the Trans Union 
board grossly negligent in the exercise of its duty of care. 10 
A like conclusion was reached in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor." In 
connection with the purchase of Technicolor, Inc. by MacAndrews & 
Forbes Group, Technicolor's investment bankers were allowed to speak 
with only three Technicolor senior executives in formulating their 
fairness opinion. The investment bankers were "told" by Technicolor's 
Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board to prepare, within 
4. Id. at I 164. 
5. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 n.17 
(Del. I 993) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 
1985), and Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
6. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984). 
7. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson, 473 
A.2d at 812). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 868. 
I 0. Id. at 874. 
11. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 345-58 (Del. 1993), modified 
on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. I 994). 
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three days, a fairness opinion based on a price of between $20 and 
$22. 12 In addition, a notice of a special meeting of Technicolor's board 
to approve the $23 per share cash merger did not disclose the reason for 
the meeting, and only a few of the directors had received the notice even 
one day prior to the meeting; three of the directors had limited 
knowledge of the proposed transaction and three of the directors had no 
knowledge of the proposed transaction prior to the meeting. 13 At the 
special meeting, the merger was approved by the entire board, including 
the Chairman, who had negotiated both the merger transaction and an 
employment agreement for himself. Additionally, he had sold his shares 
of Technicolor stock to MacAndrews. Another Technicolor director who 
had been involved in the negotiations stood to receive a $150,000 
"finder's fee." The board also approved a stock option in favor of 
MacAndrews, the repeal of the supermajority provision in Technicolor's 
certificate of incorporation, the employment agreement, and the finder's 
fee. Although one Technicolor director suggested other bids be solicited 
before agreeing to the proposed transaction, such suggestion was 
rejected; the consensus of the board appeared to be "a bird in the hand 
was better than a bigger one in the bush."14 According to the court, 
the plaintiff "clearly met its burden of proof ... that the defendant 
directors of Technicolor failed to inform themselves fully concerning all 
material information prior to approving the merger agreement."15 
In order for the board to protect itself against claims that it violated 
the duty of care, it must insist on access to all appropriate information 
reasonably available. No matter how comfortable a director may be with 
his or her own evaluation of the company, he or she should insist on a 
well-documented record, particularly regarding valuation methodology 
and the terms, conditions, and background of the proposed transaction, 
whether hostile or friendly. In this context, the retention of experienced 
investment bankers, both to aid in preparing valuation data and to 
provide an independent view on price, is clearly a wise investment. 16 
12. Id. at 361. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 357. 
15. Id. at 371; see infra Parts 11.B, III for additional discussions of Technicolor. 
I 6. Section 141 ( e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law "provides that 
directors are protected from a breach of the duty of care when the directors reasonably 
believe the information upon which they rely has been presented by an expert 'selected 
with reasonable care' and is within that person's 'professional or expert competence."' 
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In addition, the board must resist being stampeded with unreasonable 
deadlines and should insist on sufficient time to understand thoroughly 
the values in the company and the nature and terms of any transaction. 
In particular, the board should request the information necessary for it 
to evaluate the benefits and detriments of any "transaction protection" 
provisions, such as an asset or stock "lock-up," a "no-shop" clause, 
"consolation" fees, expense reimbursement provisions, or the absence of 
a "fiduciary out."17 Depending on the circumstances, it may be helpful 
for the board, if it is large, to appoint an executive or special committee 
to stay fully apprised of developments and negotiations, to provide 
guidance to the legal and financial advisors, to participate in the 
negotiations, if appropriate, and to provide a report to the full board. In 
any event, the board must take an active and participatory role in all 
negotiations and decisions. Finally, the board should insist on full 
documentation of the steps it took as well as clear articulation of its 
reasonmg. 
Where exigencies permit, it may be appropriate to separate the board's 
deliberations into multiple sessions on separate days. At the first 
session, board members should spend as much time as required 
becoming familiar with valuation matters and all the terms and 
conditions of the transaction, with a full briefing on its genesis and 
background. In later sessions, the seller's management and advisors 
should answer any remaining questions raised by the directors and the 
directors should discuss their evaluations of the transaction and all 
alternatives. While the board will necessarily rely greatly on manage-
ment and advisors to brief it fully on all material facts, the board 
members need to be active and thoughtful interrogators. If the board 
members are found to have been unaware of material facts which they 
could have discovered with reasonable inquiry, they risk failure to satisfy 
the due care standard, rendering the decision uninformed.18 
B. The Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty owed by directors to the shareholders of a 
corporation requires directors to act solely for the benefit of the 
corporation, affirmatively refraining from any course of action that 
would cause the directors to benefit at the expense of the shareholders. 
In re Cheyenne Software, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. 1494 I, Mem. Op. at 5 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 7, 1996). 
17. See infra Part V for a discussion of transaction protection mechanisms. 
18. See infra Part IV.B.9 for additional discussion of the duty of care, including 
further suggestions regarding appropriate board procedures. 
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The Delaware courts have described the duty of loyalty as one which 
"mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders 
takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or 
controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally."19 
The members of a board of directors are also deemed to be "self-
interested" in their own election. Accordingly, unilateral actions taken 
by a board of directors with the primary purpose of frustrating or 
thwarting the free exercise of the stockholder franchise may be found to 
violate the duty of loyalty. 20 
Whether a director's "self-interest" infects the entire board's decision 
to the extent of rebutting the presumption of loyalty, thereby stripping 
the board of the benefit of the business judgment rule, was addressed by 
Chancellor Allen with respect to the Technicolor transaction: 
[A] financial interest in a transaction that is material to one or more directors 
less than a majority of those voting is "significant" for burden shifting purposes 
... when the interested director controls or dominates the board as a whole or 
when the interested director fails to disclose his interest in the transaction to the 
board and a reasonable board member would have regarded the existence of the 
material interest as a significant fact in the evaluation of the proposed 
transaction. 21 
In the case of the decision to sell Technicolor to MacAndrews, for 
example, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that, with respect to the 
19. Id. at 361. 
20. See. e.g., Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
In Blasius, Blasius Industries, the owner of approximately 9% of the outstanding Atlas 
Corp. common stock, was attempting to prod the Atlas board into developing and 
implementing a restructuring proposal. Id. at 654. Blasius initiated a consent 
solicitation seeking to amend the Atlas bylaws to expand the size of the Atlas board 
from seven to fifteen members and to elect Blasius nominees to the eight new 
directorships. Id. The Atlas board of directors, in an attempt to preempt the consent 
solicitation, unilaterally expanded the size of the board to nine members and filled the 
new directorships with its own nominees. Id. at 655. Blasius brought an action to 
challenge the validity of the board's action. The Court of Chancery held that while such 
an action is not invalid per se, the "board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a 
compelling justification for such action." Id. at 661-62. The Court of Chancery found 
that the Atlas board did not have such a compelling justification and, notwithstanding 
having acted in good faith, had committed an "unintended breach of the duty of loyalty." 
Id. at 663. The holding in Blasius is not, however, applicable to actions that affect the 
stockholder franchise but that are approved by fully infortned shareholders. See Stroud 
v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 95 (Del. 1992), and Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 
(Del. 1996). 
21. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1153 (Del. Ch. 1994), 
ajf' d, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). 
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issues of loyalty, "a large majority of the board of Technicolor was 
disinterested and independent ... and neither of those two directors 
found or assumed to be interested, dominated or manipulated the process 
of board consideration."22 As with a breach of the duty of care, if a 
plaintiff meets the burden of proving a breach of the duty of loyalty, the 
decision reached by the board of directors will not receive the benefit of 
the business judgment rule. Instead, the board will be required to prove 
"entire fairness," as described in Part III of this Article.23 
III. THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS STANDARD 
In the event that a shareholder plaintiff is successful in rebutting the 
presumption of the business judgment rule by offering evidence that the 
directors breached their fiduciary duties, the burden shifts to the directors 
to prove that the challenged transaction was "entirely fair" to all 
shareholders.24 The entire fairness standard also applies to decisions 
made by "interested" directors (e.g., directors who are on both sides of 
a transaction or have a financial interest not shared by stockholders 
generally). A determination that a board of directors failed to demon-
strate the entire fairness of a transaction will lead to substantive 
liability.25 
As demonstrated by the holding in Technicolor that the transaction in 
question was entirely fair, "an initial judicial determination that a given 
breach of a board's fiduciary duties has rebutted the presumption of the 
22. Id. at 1151. 
23. The fiduciary duties of the board of directors of a Delaware corporation also 
include a "duty of candor," pursuant to which directors must '"disclose fully and fairly 
all material information within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action.' 
The obligation attaches to proxy statements and any other disclosures in contemplation 
of stockholder action. The essential inquiry is whether the alleged omission or 
misrepresentation is material." Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 
1277 (Del. 1994) (citations omitted) (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 
I 992)). The Arnold court described the applicable materiality standard as follows: 
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . It does 
not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have caused a reasonable investor to change his vote. What the 
standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under 
all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance 
in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. 
Id. at 1277 (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976), which was 
adopted as the Delaware standard in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 
(Del. 1985)). For a comprehensive examination of the Delaware cases regarding a 
director's disclosure duties, see Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate 
Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. I 087 (1996). 
24. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995). 
25. Id. at 1163. 
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business judgment rule does not preclude a subsequent determination that 
the board action was entirely fair, and is, therefore, not outcome-
determinative per se."26 It should be noted, however, that "[b]ecause 
the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so 
powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determina-
tion of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is 
determinative of the outcome of litigation."27 "To avoid substantive 
liability, notwithstanding the quantum of adverse evidence that has 
defeated the business judgment rule's protective procedural presumption, 
the board will have to demonstrate entire fairness by presenting evidence 
of the cumulative manner by which it otherwise discharged all of its 
fiduciary duties. "28 
Because the Delaware courts do not defer to the business judgment of 
the directors in cases that apply the entire fairness standard, the holdings 
and dicta of such cases provide important guidance for boards regarding 
how to structure the process of reviewing a business combination 
transaction in order to meet their fiduciary duties. The standard itself 
was explained by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger: 
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The 
former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was 
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to directors, and how the approvals 
of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of 
fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed 
merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future 
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of 
a company's stock. . . . However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one 
as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined 
as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness. 29 
Although demanding, an entire fairness test does not require perfection 
on the part of the board. The chancery court's finding that the 
Technicolor transaction was entirely fair to the shareholders, a decision 
26. Id.; see also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 1995 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 44 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1995), aff'd, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995); Rabkin v. Olin 
Corp., 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851 (Del. Ch. 1990), ajf'd, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990); 
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid, 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
27. Technicolor, 663 A.2d at 1163 n.8 (quoting AC Acquisitions Corp. v. 
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)). 
28. Id. at 1163. 
29. Id. at 1162-63 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 
1983)). 
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ultimately affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, rested on the 
following basis: 
( I) CEO Kamerman consistently sought the highest price that Perelman would 
pay; (2) Kamerman was better informed about the strengths and weaknesses of 
Technicolor as a business than anyone else ... ; (3) Kamerman and later the 
board were advised by firms who were among the best in the country; (4) the 
negotiations led to a price that was very high when compared to the prior 
market price of the stock (about a 100% premium over unaffected market price) 
... ; (5) while the company was not shopped there is no indication in the 
record that more money was possible from Mr. Perelman or likely from anyone 
else; rand] management declined to do an MBO transaction at a higher price. 
,,3b 
The fact that a majority of the board was disinterested and the material 
conflict of the one interested director had been disclosed, combined with 
the process of considering and negotiating the transaction and the price 
paid, led to the determination that the transaction was entirely fair. 31 
IV. UNOCAL SCRUTINY AND REVLON DUTIES 
Under certain circumstances, the Delaware courts will not afford the 
board of directors of a corporation the benefit of the business judgment 
rule without certain additional tests being met. In the case of board 
action with respect to (a) defensive measures taken unilaterally by the 
board in response to a threat to corporate control or effectiveness, or (b) 
a transaction involving a sale of control or the breakup of the company, 
Delaware courts will examine, using certain specific tests, the reason-
ableness of the board's actions. 
A. Unocal Scrutiny 
1. Unocal 
Before applying the business judgment rule to a board decision 
concerning defensive measures employed against a threatened takeover, 
Delaware courts require that the actions of the board of directors meet 
a two-pronged test first articulated in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co. 32 Unocal involved an exchange offer by Unocal Corporation for 
its own shares in order to defend against a hostile acquisition by Mesa 
Petroleum Company.33 Mesa, which held approximately 13% of 
Unocal 's outstanding common stock, proposed a two-tiered, front-end 
30. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1140 (Del. Ch. 1994), 
ajf'd, 663 A.2d I 156 (Del. 1995). 
31. Id. at 1144. 
32. 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). 
33. Id. 
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loaded merger, whereby Mesa would purchase approximately 37% of 
Unocal 's outstanding common stock in a tender offer for $54 per share 
in cash. The remaining shareholders of Unocal would then exchange 
their shares for back-end merger consideration consisting of highly 
subordinated securities purportedly worth $54 per share. After rejecting 
the Mesa offer, the Unocal board approved an exchange offer, condi-
tioned upon Mesa acquiring the shares it had tendered for, pursuant to 
which the remaining 49% of the outstanding Unocal shares would be 
exchanged for $72 per share in senior debt securities of Unocal. The 
board excluded Mesa from participating in the exchange offer in order 
to avoid displacing other stockholders from the opportunity to have a 
greater number of their shares repurchased and to keep from financing 
Mesa's "inadequate" proposal. Mesa then sued to enjoin the self-tender 
and its exclusion therefrom, charging that the discriminatory self-tender 
was a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties. 34 
In determining whether the board of directors possessed the power and 
the duty to take defensive measures to protect against a perceived threat 
to the corporation, the Unocal court stated: 
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to 
determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders. In that respect a board's duty is no different from any other 
responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to the 
respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment. 
There are, however, certain caveats to a proper exercise of this function. 
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its 
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is 
an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before 
the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred. 
In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had 
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership. However, 
they satisfy that burden "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation . 
. . . " Furthermore, such proof is materially enhanced, as here, by the approval 
of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors who have 
acted in accordance with the foregoing standards. 3 
The court further held that: 
The standard of proof established in Cheff v. Mathes as discussed supra ... is 
designed to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is 
34. Id. at 949-51. 
35. Id. at 954-55 (citations omitted) (quoting Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-
55 (Del. I 964)). 
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indeed motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and 
its stockholders, which in all circwnstances must be free of any fraud or other 
misconduct. However, this does not end the inquiry. 
A further aspect is the element of balance. If a defensive measure is to come 
within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation 
to the threat posed. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the 
takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such 
concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of 
the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on "constituencies" other than 
shareholders (e.g., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the 
community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of 
securities being offered in the exchange. 36 
Thus, under Unocal, a board must prove that (i) the board reasonably 
believed, after due investigation, that the corporate enterprise was in fact 
threatened and (ii) the defensive measures undertaken to protect the 
corporation were reasonable in relation to the perceived threat. 
According to Unocal and its progeny, if the first prong is satisfied, the 
scrutiny of a court turns to the second prong, which requires an objective 
analysis of the proportionality of the response. 
In applying the first prong in the Unocal case, the court noted that the 
Unocal directors had determined that the company was worth substantial-
ly more than the $54 per share in cash offered in the front-end tender, 
and that the back-end of Mesa's proposed merger was worth far less 
than $54. The court further stated: 
It is now well recognized that [two-tier] offers are a classic coercive measure 
designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the 
price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the 
transaction. Wholly beyond the coercive aspect of an inadequate two-tiered 
tender offer, the threat was posed by a corporate raider with a national 
reputation as a "greenrnailer. "3 
The court found that the Unocal board had, in good faith and with 
reasonable investigation, determined that Mesa's offer posed a threat to 
Unocal 's corporate policy and effectiveness. With respect to the 
balancing required under the second prong, the Unocal court found that, 
given the coercive nature of the Mesa tender offer and the fact that 
allowing Mesa to participate in the exchange offer would "effectively 
subsidize" Mesa's tender offer, the selective exchange offer was 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 38 The dual goals of the 
exchange offer, to defeat the inadequate Mesa offer and to provide at 
least 49% of Unocal 's shareholders with adequate value for their shares 
36. Id. at 955 (citing Chejf, 199 A.2d at 554-55). 
37. Id. at 956. 
38. Id. 
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if the Mesa transaction was consummated, were found valid by the 
court.39 
2. Time 
In litigation stemming from the battle for control of Time Inc., the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that Time's tender offer for Warner 
Communication's stock was a reasonable response to the threat posed by 
Paramount Communication's tender offer for Time stock.40 Prior to 
Paramount's tender offer, Time and Warner had agreed to a stock-for-
stock merger whereby Warner would be merged into a Time subsidiary 
and Warner and Time shareholders would receive 62% and 38%, 
respectively, of the combined entity. The merger, touted as a "merger 
of equals," was the result of a several year process during which Time 
sought an alliance in order to pursue its long-term strategy of combining 
its "distribution" capacity with a company with a strong "content" 
capability.41 That strategy, however, was tempered by Time 
management's requirement that the "Time culture," including its 
commitment to journalistic integrity, be preserved. The Time-Warner 
merger was structured so as to provide Time sufficient comfort as to the 
preservation of the "Time culture."42 
However, on June 7, 1989, two weeks after Time had sent out a proxy 
to its shareholders,43 Paramount announced an all-cash offer for Time 
shares at $175 per share. Time refused to negotiate with Paramount, the 
Time board deeming the offer inadequate both as to price and Time's 
long-term strategy. While the Time board's members believed that its 
shareholders "would not comprehend the long-term benefits of the 
Warner merger," the board was resolved to fight the perceived Para-
39. Id. at 957. 
40. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del. 
1989). 
41. Id. at 1145-46. 
42. Id. at 1 144 n.4. 
43. Pursuant to New York Stock Exchange Rules, the exchange on which the Time 
shares were traded, the affirmative vote of a majority of Time shareholders was required 
in order to effect the issuance of the shares required to complete the Time-Warner 
merger. See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, Section 312.03. Time 
requested the New York Stock Exchange to alter its rules and allow the Time-Warner 
merger to proceed without stockholder approval, but such request was rejected. Id. at 
1148. 
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mount threat because "[t]he board's prevailing belief was that 
Paramount's bid proposed a threat to Time's control of its own destiny" 
and "that a combination with Warner offered greater potential for 
Time."44 Time's board also restructured the proposed merger with 
Warner whereby Time would make an all-cash offer for 51 % of 
Warner's stock at $70 per share with back-end merger consideration of 
cash and stock.45 When Paramount raised its offer to $200 in cash per 
Time share, the Time board refused the offer, again citing inadequate 
price, the threat to the Time culture and long-term strategy, and other 
conditions to Paramount's offer, including the removal of potential 
regulatory and legal constraints that clouded the certainty of the 
proposed merger's consummation.46 
In addressing the application of the Unocal standard, the Delaware 
Supreme Court began by noting that it was not the role of the court to 
pass on the "wisdom" of the Time board's decision, but whether, as the 
lower court had concluded, "the initial Time-Warner agreement was the 
product of a proper exercise of business judgment."47 Focusing on 
Time's long and deliberate search for a business combination that would 
enhance Time's long-term strategy and protect the "Time culture," the 
court found "ample" evidence that the original stock-for-stock "merger 
with Warner was entitled to the protection of the business judgment 
rule."48 With respect to the revised merger agreement, however, there 
was no doubt that the actions of the Time board would be judged under 
the Unocal standard. The court rejected Paramount's argument that an 
all-cash tender offer for all shares that is reasonably within a range of 
values that would be acceptable to shareholders cannot be a threat to a 
corporation and its shareholders.49 The court thereby rejected 
Paramount's argument "that a hostile tender offer can pose only two 
types of threats: the threat of coercion that results from a two-tier offer 
promising unequal treatment for non-tendering shareholders; and the 
threat of inadequate value from an all-shares, all-cash offer at a price 
below what a target board in good faith deems to be the present value 
of its shares. "50 To do so, the court maintained, would be to substitute 
the judgment of the court for the judgment of the board of directors as 
to which deal was "better. "51 
44. Time, 571 A.2d at 1148. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 1149. 
47. Id. at 1151. 
48. Id. at 1152. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 1152-53. 
51. Id. at 1153. 
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With respect to the second prong of the Unocal test, the court noted 
that "[t]he fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the 
selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals," which 
may not be delegated by the directors to the shareholders.52 "Directors 
are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for 
a short-term shareholder rrofit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain 
the corporate strategy. "5 Because there existed a basis to sustain 
Time's corporate strategy, including its choice of Warner as favored 
merger partner, the defensive restructuring of the Time-Warner merger 
was deemed reasonable in response to the perceived threat. In addition, 
the finding of proportionality was also supported by the fact that 
Paramount could, if it chose to do so, seek to acquire the combined 
Time/Warner entity.54 
3. Unitrin 
In early 1995, the Delaware Supreme Court revisited the second prong 
of the Unocal standard in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. 55 
The case arose from American General Corporation's unsolicited offer 
to acquire all of the outstanding common stock of Unitrin, Inc. for $503/e 
per share in cash, a 30% premium to the market price. American 
General also indicated that it would be willing to negotiate a higher 
price. Unitrin's financial advisors concluded that the American General 
offer was inadequate but did not provide a range of values that might 
have facilitated negotiations with American General for an appropriate 
price. The Unitrin board then officially rejected the American General 
offer. After American General publicly announced its offer, the Unitrin 
board adopted a "poison pill" and amended Unitrin's by-laws to require 
60 days' advance notice of a shareholder's intention to nominate board 
members or submit proposals for consideration at an annual 
stockholders' meeting. Most importantly, one week later, the board 
authorized the repurchase of up to ten million shares of its own stock on 
the open market using approximately $500 million of corporate funds 
(the "Repurchase Program"). Prior to giving effect to the Repurchase 
52. Id. at 1154. 
53. Id. (citation omitted). 
54. See infra Part IV.B for the application of Revlon to the Time/Warner merger. 
55. 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). 
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Program, a group of Unitrin directors controlled approximately 23% of 
the Unitrin common stock. After giving effect to the proposed buy-
back, such directors would have controlled approximately 28% of the 
common stock. Given that Unitrin's certificate of incorporation required 
a supermajority vote of 75% of the stockholders to approve any merger 
not supported by the board of directors, American General contended 
that the Unitrin board would have had effective veto power over any 
proposed merger. 
The Delaware Court of Chancery determined that, given the existence 
of the "poison pill" defense, the Repurchase Program was a dispropor-
tionate response to the "mild" threat posed by American General's 
negotiable, all-cash/all-shares offer.56 The Delaware Supreme Court, 
however, concluded that the lower court "applied an incorrect legal 
standard when it ruled that the Unitrin board's decision to authorize the 
Repurchase Program was disproportionate because it was 'unneces-
sary. "'57 The supreme court then noted that: 
[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the 
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a board 
selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second guess 
that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events 
may have cast doubt on the board's determination. Thus, courts will not 
substitute their business judgment for that of the directors, but will determine 
if the directors' decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness. 58 
The supreme court then described the second prong of Unocal as 
follows: "If a defensive measure is not draconian, however, because it 
is not either coercive or preclusive, the Unocal proportionality test 
requires the focus of enhanced judicial scrutiny to shift to 'the range of 
reasonableness. "'59 
In applying the first prong of Unocal, the supreme court identified the 
threat reasonably perceived by the Unitrin directors as "substantive 
coercion, i.e., that Unitrin's shareholders might accept American 
General's inadequate Offer because of 'ignorance or mistaken belief' 
regarding the Board's assessment of the long-term value of Unitrin's 
stock."60 In applying the second prong, the supreme court stated that 
there was no showing on the record that the Repurchase Program was 
coercive. The supreme court remanded the case to the Court of 
56. In re Unitrin, Inc. Shareholders Litig., I 994 WL 698453, at *2, • I 9 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. I 3, 1994 ). 
57. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385. 
58. Id. at 1385-86 (quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 
637 A.2d 34, 45-46 (Del 1993) (citations omitted)). 
59. Id. at 1387-88 (quoting QVC, 637 A.2d at 45-46). 
60. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385 (citations omitted). 
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Chancery for a determination of whether the Repurchase Program was 
preclusive and, if not, whether it was within a range of reasonableness. 
The supreme court directed the Court of Chancery to focus on "whether 
Unitrin's Repurchase Program would only inhibit American General's 
ability to wage a proxy fight and institute a merger or whether it was, 
in fact, preclusive because American General's success would either be 
mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable."61 Earlier in the 
opinion, the supreme court had concluded, based on certain assumptions, 
that the record appeared to reflect that American General could still 
undertake a proxy contest to gain the power to combine the two 
companies. The court stated that if American General was to initiate a 
proxy contest before acquiring 15% of Unitrin's stock, it would need to 
amass only 45.1 % of the votes assuming a 90% voter turnout. If it 
commenced a tender offer at an attractive price contemporaneously with 
its proxy contest, it could seek to acquire 50.1 % of the outstanding 
voting stock.62 The supreme court took issue with "the Court of 
Chancery's sua sponte determination that Unitrin's outside directors, 
who are also substantial stockholders, would not vote like other 
stockholders in a proxy contest, i.e., in their own best economic 
interests."63 In particular, the supreme court found that the Court of 
Chancery's determination that "the stockholder directors of Unitrin 
would reject an 'excellent offer,' unless it compensated them for giving 
up the 'prestige and perquisites' of directorship, appears to be subjective 
and without record support. It cannot be presumed."64 The supreme 
court also noted, approvingly, that the board's conclusion that "a 
Repurchase Program would provide additional liquidity to those 
stockholders who wished to realize short-term gain, and would provide 
enhanced value to those stockholders who wished to maintain a long-
term investment."65 The supreme court directed the Court of Chancery, 
if it reached consideration of whether the Repurchase Propam was 
within a range of reasonableness, to take this into account.6 Also to 
be taken into account were "whether (I) [the Repurchase Program] is a 
statutorily authorized form of business decision which a board of 
61. Id. at 1388-89. 
62. Id. at 1382-83. 
63. Id. at 1380. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1384. 
66. Id. at 1389. 
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directors may routinely make in a non-takeover context; (2) as a 
defensive response to American General's Offer it was limited and 
corresponded in degree or magnitude to the degree or magnitude of the 
threat (i.e., assuming the threat was relatively 'mild,' was the response 
relatively 'mild?') .... "67 
B. Revlon Duties 
1. Revlon 
Under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,68 and 
its progeny, the duties of the board of directors are, in certain circum-
stances, conclusively deemed to be concerned solely with maximizing 
short-term shareholder value. One such circumstance is a transaction 
that will result in a change of control of the "selling" company, such a 
transaction being the last opportunity for current shareholders to receive 
a control premium for their shares even if they retain an equity interest 
in the entity resulting from the transaction. Other such circumstances 
include: (i) when a corporation initiates an active bidding process 
seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a 
clear breakup of the company and (ii) when, in response to a bidder's 
offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative 
transaction involving the breakup of the company. According to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, the decision by the board of Revlon to end the 
active bidding process between Pantry Pride and Forstmann Little by 
granting Forstmann Little the right to purchase certain "crown jewels" 
of Revlon, a no-shop provision and a $25 million breakup fee was a 
breach of the Revlon board members' fiduciary duties. The fiduciary 
duties were breached when, as a result of increasing bids from Pantry 
Pride, it became apparent that the break-up of the company was 
inevitable.69 According to the Revlon court: 
The Revlon board's authorization permitting management to negotiate a merger 
or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was for sale. 
The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a 
corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the 
67. Id. For a later case applying the Unitrin analysis to the second Unocal prong, 
see Moore Corporation Limited v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 
1463 (D. Del. 1995) (retention of poison pill by Wallace after receipt of all-cash/all-
shares offer found not to be preclusive or coercive because Moore could pursue a proxy 
contest to replace target board and found to be within the range of reasonableness 
because the Board of Directors of Wallace reasonably believed that shareholders were 
entitled to protection from what they determined was a "low ball" offer). 
68. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. I 986). 
69. Id. at 182. 
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stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibilities 
under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and 
effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. 
The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The directors' role 
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with 
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company. 70 
The Revlon court did, however, note that lock-ups and related agree-
ments are not prohibited under Delaware law when approved in 
accordance with directors' fiduciary duties.71 
2. Mills 
In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,72 the Delaware Supreme 
Court applied Revlon and an entire fairness standard to enjoin an asset 
lock-up and a no-shop agreement granted to a bidder in connection with 
a slightly superior bid at the end of an "unfair" auction. The court went 
on to find that, in general, the Unocal standard of review would apply 
to decisions of the board of directors on the manner in which to conduct 
an auction governed by Revlon. An offer by Robert Maxwell was 
competing against a management buy-out led by Kohlberg Kravis, 
Roberts & Co (KKR). The Mills court described the board's Revlon 
duties by stating: "[T]he proper objective of Macmillan's fiduciaries 
was to obtain the highest price reasonably available for the company, 
provided it was offered by a reputable and responsible bidder."73 
The court found that the auction process was "clandestinely and 
impermissibly skewed in favor of KKR."74 KKR had been given, after 
executing a confidentiality agreement, "detailed, non-public, financial 
information of Macmillan, culminating in a series of formal 'due 
diligence' presentations to KKR representatives by Macmillan senior 
management .... "75 Maxwell, however, did not enjoy the same level 
of contact with Macmillan. In fact, Macmillan did not respond at all to 
Maxwell's offer. In order to force the issue, Maxwell launched a tender 
offer at $80 per share, subject to receiving the same information that had 
been provided to KKR. Maxwell subsequently contacted Macmillan to 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 176. 
72. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988). 
73. Id. at 1282 ( citations omitted). 
74. Id. at 1281. 
75. Id. at 1272. 
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discuss the possibility of brokering a friendly merger or the purchase of 
Macmillan's information business for $1 billion. "Significantly, no 
Macmillan representative ever attempted to negotiate with Maxwell on 
any of these matters."76 Further, Maxwell was not provided the same 
detailed information on Macmillan until almost two months after KKR 
was afforded such contact. Finally, while the chief executive officer of 
Macmillan suggested to KKR that Macmillan's management "endorse 
the concept and structure of the buyout to the board of directors, even 
though KKR had not yet disclosed ... the amount of its bid," Maxwell 
was given less than 24 hours to prepare his bid before the auction was 
closed. 77 According to the court, the Macmillan board favored the 
KKR buyout in order to benefit management, in breach of the board's 
fiduciary duties under Revlon. 
The final KKR bid was slightly higher than Maxwell's, but required 
agreement to no-shop language, the grant of a lock-up option on certain 
crown jewels, and the execution of a definitive merger agreement by the 
next day. No such conditions were contained in the Maxwell bid. The 
special committee selected KKR as the winner and a merger agreement 
was signed. A later bid by Maxwell that was slightly higher than the 
KKR offer that was accepted was rejected because it was conditioned 
upon the invalidation of the asset lock-up. 
The Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined the operation of 
Macmillan's poison pill in order to permit shareholders to consider both 
offers, but held that the asset lock-up and the break-up fee and expenses 
were reasonable, since Maxwell had an opportunity to submit his highest 
offer in the auction process.78 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed 
the injunction against the poison pill, but reversed the failure to grant an 
injunction against the lock-up option and the fees because the auction 
was flawed. The supreme court indicated that the board should have 
recognized that the various procedural biases in favor of KKR could 
have acted to prevent Maxwell from submitting his highest bid. In 
addition, the court found that agreement to the option and fees was 
unjustified in light of the minor differences between the two bids. The 
court emphasized that where the playing field is tipped in favor of one 
bidder over another, such action must be "reasonable in relation to the 
advantage sought to be achieved or, conversely, to the threat which a 
particular bid allegedly poses to stockholder interests."79 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 1273. 
78. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 1988 WL I 08332 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 
1988), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988). 
79. Id. at 1288 (citation omitted). 
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In Barkan v. Amsted Industries Inc., plaintiff shareholders claimed that 
the directors of Amsted had breached their Revlon duties in approving 
a management buyout involving an employee stock option plan. The 
management buyout was approved by a special committee of the board 
of directors, after the special committee negotiated an increase in the 
cash portion of the merger consideration. The Delaware Supreme Court 
noted that: "Although the Special Committee was given the power to 
evaluate the fairness of any acquisition proposal made by a third party, 
the Committee was instructed not to engage in an active search for 
alternatives to an MBO."80 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a 
Delaware Court of Chancery decision approving the settlement of 
lawsuits challenging a management buyout of Amsted. While the 
special committee did not actively seek other competing bids prior to 
approving the management buyout, the record reflected that the 
investment community had known for several months that Amsted was 
"in play" and no other bids had been received. Further, a stockholder 
rights plan had been removed five weeks prior to the consummation of 
the management buyout transaction. The plaintiff shareholders claimed 
that the selling process was not designed to obtain the highest price 
available for Amsted and that the requirements of Revlon had thus not 
been satisfied. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that: 
Revlon does not demand that every change in the control of a Delaware 
corporation he preceded by a heated bidding contest. Revlon is merely one of 
an unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise 
in the field of mergers and acquisitions by demanding that directors act with 
scrupulous concern for fairness to shareholders. When multiple bidders are 
competing for control, this concern for fairness forbids directors from using 
defensive mechanisms to thwart an auction or to favor one bidder over another. 
When the board is considering a single offer and has no reliable grounds upon 
which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness demands a canvas of the 
market to determine if higher bids may be elicited. When, however, the 
directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which to evaluate the fairness 
of a transaction, they may approve that transaction without conducting an active 
survey of the market. As the Chancellor recognized, the circumstances in 
which this passive approach is acceptable are limited. "A decent respect for 
reality forces one to admit that ... advice [of an investment banker] is 
frequently a pale substitute for the dependable infonnation that a canvas of the 
80. 567 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Del. 1989). 
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relevant market can provide." The need for adequate information is central to 
the enlightened evaluation of a transaction that a board must make. Neverthe-
less, there is no single method that a board must employ to acquire such 
information.81 
The supreme court affirmed the court of chancery's holding that 
Amsted's directors had "acted in good faith to arrange the best possible 
transaction for shareholders."82 Later in its opinion, the supreme court 
further limited its holding as follows: 
We certainly do not condone in all instances the imposition of the sort of "no 
shop" restriction that bound Amsted's Special Committee. Where a board has 
no reasonable basis upon which to judge the adequacy of a contemplated 
transaction, a no-shop restriction gives rise to the inference that the board seeks 
to forestall competing bids. Even here, a judicious market survey might have 
been desirable . . . . [W)e decline to fashion an iron-clad rule for determining 
when a market test is not required. The evidence that will support a finding of 
good faith in the absence of some sort of market test is by nature circumstan-
tial; therefore, its evaluation by a court must be open-textured. However, the 
crucial element supporting a finding of good faith is knowledge. It must be 
clear that the board had sufficient knowledge of relevant markets to form the 
basis for its belief that it acted in the best interests of the shareholders. The 
situations in which a completely passive approach to acquiring such knowledge 
is appropriate are limited. 83 
4. Time 
In Time, it was argued that Revlon duties were triggered as a result of 
the Time-Warner stock-for-stock merger agreement (pursuant to which 
Warner stockholders would own 62% of the combined entity).84 The 
Delaware Court of Chancery rejected the Revlon claim, finding that there 
was no change of control because control of both Time and the new 
Time-Warner would be in "a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated sharehold-
ers representing a voting majority-in other words, in the market."85 
In affirming the chancery court's holding, the Delaware Supreme Court 
focused on the fact that, as opposed to the circumstances in Revlon, the 
dissolution or break-up of Time did not become inevitable upon either 
the commencement of merger negotiations with Warner or the recasting 
of the merger structure.86 Furthermore, the court noted that Paramount 
was not foreclosed from making a bid for the combined Time-Warner 
entity and that, therefore, the shareholders were not foreclosed perma-
81. Id. at 1286-87 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Amsted 
Indus. Litig., 1988 WL 92736, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1988)). 
82. Id. at 1287; see infra Part IV.B.10 for additional discussion of market checks. 
83. Id. at 1288. 
84. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
85. Id. at 1150 (quoting the Chancellor's conclusion). 
86. Id. 
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nently from enjoying a control premium, two circumstances which 
warrant application of Revlon duties. The court also rejected an 
argument by the plaintiffs that use of deal protection mechanisms, such 
as a lock-up agreement and a no-shop clause, prevented shareholders 
from obtaining a control premium in the immediate future and thus 
violated Revlon. The court stated: 
We agree with the Chancellor that such evidence is entirely insufficient to 
invoke Revlon duties; and we decline to extend Revlon's application to 
corporate transactions simply because they might be construed as putting a 
corporation "in play" or "up for sale." The adoption of structural safety devices 
alone does not trigger Revlon. Rather, as the Chancellor stated, such devices 
are properly subject to a Unocal analysis.87 
5. QVC 
In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,88 the 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision that a proposed 
stock-for-stock merger between Paramount and Viacom Inc. triggered 
Revlon duties because the controlling stockholder of Viacom would own 
approximately 70% of the voting securities of the combined company 
after the merger. The court distinguished Time based on the fact that 
both before and after the Time/Warner merger, Time was owned by "a 
fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders."89 In contrast, the 
proposed Paramount/Viacom merger would have shifted "control of 
Paramount from the public stockholders to a controlling shareholder . 
• • • "
90 The supreme court noted that: "Once control has shifted, the 
current Paramount stockholders will have no leverage in the future to 
demand another control premium. As a result, the Paramount stockhold-
87. Id. at I 151 (citations omitted). 
88. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). 
89. Id. at 46. 
90. Id. at 48. The QVC court noted that it was deciding only the case before it, 
a case "which, on its facts, is clearly controlled by established Delaware law. Here, the 
proposed change of control and the implications thereof were crystal clear." Id. at 51. 
A test for a "change of control" for purposes of Revlon has not been articulated. In light 
of the Delaware courts' stated concern with maintaining the opportunity for public 
stockholders of the combined company to receive a control premium (notwithstanding 
the existence of a privately-held block of shares), it is not clear what form such a 
"change of control" test would take. 
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ers are entitled to receive, and should receive, a control premium and/or 
protective devices of significant value."91 
The following is a brief summary of the facts in QVC. After several 
months of on and off negotiations, Paramount and Viacom agreed to a 
stock-for-stock merger. Under the terms of the proposed September 
1993 Paramount/Viacom merger agreement, shares of Paramount 
common stock would have been converted into .10 shares of Viacom 
Class A voting stock and .90 shares of Viacom Class B nonvoting stock 
and $9.10 in cash (a value of approximately $69 per share). Upon 
consummation of the merger, the controlling shareholder of Viacom 
would have owned approximately 70% of the voting securities of the 
combined ParamountNiacom entity. After the announcement of the 
Paramount/Viacom merger, QVC Network, which had previously 
expressed an interest in Paramount, contacted Paramount and offered 
.893 shares of QVC common stock and $30 in cash for each share of 
Paramount common stock (a value of approximately $80 per share). At 
a meeting of the Paramount board of directors called to discuss the QVC 
offer, the board's members were instructed by Paramount's Chairman 
and CEO that, under the terms of the "no-shop" provision of the 
Paramount/Viacom agreement, Paramount was restricted from negotiat-
ing with QVC until QVC provided evidence of its ability to finance the 
merger. After QVC provided such evidence, the Paramount board 
authorized management to meet with QVC. QVC subsequently 
announced a tender offer for 50 .1 % of Paramount 's outstanding common 
stock at $80 per share in cash. In the second step of the merger, each 
remaining share of Paramount common stock would be converted into 
1.42875 shares of QVC common stock. In response to the competing 
QVC bid, Paramount and Viacom renegotiated their proposed merger 
and agreed to an $80 cash bid by Viacom for 50.1 % of Paramount 
common stock, and a second-step merger that would convert each 
remaining Paramount share into .20408 shares of Viacom Class A voting 
stock, 1.08317 shares of Viacom Class B nonvoting stock, and .20408 
shares of a new series of Viacom convertible preferred stock. After both 
Viacom and QVC had launched their respective tender offers, Viacom 
raised the cash portion of its bid to $85 per share, with a similar increase 
91. Id. at 43. The court, while expressing no opmton on the effect such 
"protective devices" would have had in the case, listed some devices: "Examples of 
such protective provisions are supermajority voting provisions, majority of the minority 
requirements etc." Id. at 42 n.12. The court also referred to standstill provisions. Id. 
Although no guidance is provided about how to evaluate such protective devices, it is 
clear that boards of directors will have some ability to take such devices into account 
in evaluating offers. 
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in the back-end value, which was subsequently topped by QVC's $90 
per share bid. Notwithstanding the fact that the Paramount board did not 
communicate with QVC because of its interpretation of the restrictions 
imposed upon it by the no-shop agreement, "the Paramount Board 
determined that the new QVC offer was not in the best interests of the 
[Paramount] stockholders."92 
After holding that enhanced duties were triggered, the Delaware 
Supreme Court stated that "when bidders make relatively similar offers, 
or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot 
fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the 
contending factions."93 When enhanced duties apply, the board of a 
selling corporation must "act on an informed basis to secure the best 
value reasonably available to the stockholders."94 According to the 
court in QVC, the directors of Paramount were "paralyzed by their 
uninformed belief that the QVC offer was 'illusory'" and thus failed to 
determine whether they had obtained the best value reasonably available 
under the circumstances.95 
6. Arnold 
In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Jnc.,96 the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that, in a stock-for-stock merger that does not result 
in a change in control, Revlon duties do not attach. The opinion also 
suggests that a corporation may move into the realm of Revlon duties 
and then subsequently remove itself from the application of such duties. 
In early 1991, the financially troubled Society for Savings Bancorp, 
Incorporated announced that it had retained a financial advisor to seek 
transactions which would enhance shareholder value. Offers, either for 
Society as a whole or in parts, were not readily forthcoming. The offers 
that did materialize, including an offer from Society's financial advisor 
to purchase part of Society's assets, were heavily conditioned and 
doubtful as to their ability to reach consummation. The board of Society 
ultimately dismissed its financial advisor and issued a public statement 
92. Id. at 41. 
93. Id. at 46 (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)). 
94. Id. at 37. 
95. Id. at 50. 
96. 650 A.2d 1270, 1273 (Del. 1994). 
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that it "intended to focus on strengthening itself as an independent 
entity."97 Subsequently, the Bank of Boston contacted Society to 
discuss the possibility of an acquisition of Society. Under the terms of 
a proposed merger that emerged from negotiations, each Society share 
would be exchanged for . 78 of a Bank of Boston share. In addition, the 
proposal included a no-shop provision as well as lock-up rights. The 
final version of the merger agreement approved by the board of Society 
provided for an exchange of each Society share for .80 of a Bank of 
Boston share, based on the trading price of Bank of Boston shares at the 
closing (subject to an adjustable $20 per share cap) and modified lock-up 
and no-shop provisions. In connection with the no-shop provision that 
was granted to the Bank of Boston, Society negotiated a "fiduciary out." 
The Delaware Court of Chancery had rejected the plaintiff's claim 
that, when Society agreed to merge with the Bank of Boston, Revlon 
duties were triggered.98 Citing Time, the chancery court noted that 
Society had neither "put itself on the auction block when it began 
negotiation with [the Bank of Boston]" nor abandoned its long-term 
strategy in response to a bidder's offer, the two traditional Revlon 
triggers.99 According to the Court of Chancery, while Revlon duties 
had certainly been implicated upon the public announcement of the 
hiring of a financial advisor to seek bidders for Society, such duties did 
not apply to the subsequent merger with the Bank of Boston because, in 
the interim, the board of directors of Society had made a deliberate 
choice to remain independent and return to its long-term strategy.100 
The plaintiff further argued that, once Society had decided to enter 
into the stock-for-stock merger with the Bank of Boston, Revlon duties 
attached. The chancery court, however, supported by the Delaware 
Supreme Court, found that Revlon duties were never implicated in this 
circumstance because there was no change of control of Society. 101 
The supreme court noted that a "sale or change of control" was not 
implicated in this case because ownership of Society was being retained 
by a large, fluid aggregation of public shareholders. 102 
97. Id. at 1275. 
98. Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 275 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. I 7, 1993), affd in part, rev 'din part, 650 A.2d 1270, 1273 (Del. 1994). 
99. Id. at *31 (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 
1140, 1151-52 (Del. 1989)). 
100. Id. 
IOI. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1289. 
102. Id. at 1289-90 (citing Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 
637 A.2d 34, 42-47 (Del. 1993)). 
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In June 1994, Santa Fe Pacific Corporation and Burlington Northern, 
Inc. (BNI) agreed to a stock-for-stock merger based on an exchange ratio 
of 0.27 BNI shares for each share of Santa Fe (worth about $13.50 per 
Santa Fe share). 103 Subsequently, Union Pacific Corporation proposed 
a competing stock-for-stock merger with Santa Fe worth about $18 per 
Santa Fe share. The Santa Fe board, basing its decision on antitrust 
concerns, the inadequacy of the offered price, and the fact that the Santa 
Fe/BNI merger agreement did not allow Santa Fe to consider Union 
Pacific's bid, rejected the competing offer. After BNI and Union Pacific 
both improved their bids, Union Pacific commenced a tender offer for 
up to 57.1 % of Santa Fe stock. Santa Fe recommended to its sharehold-
ers that they not tender their shares into the Union Pacific tender offer. 
After Santa Fe adopted a "poison pill," Santa Fe and BNI amended their 
merger agreement to allow for a joint tender offer whereby both 
companies would purchase up to 33% of Santa Fe's shares for $20 per 
share in cash. The tender offer was conditioned upon Santa Fe's 
shareholders approving a "back-end" merger with BNI, the consideration 
for which was to be 0.4 BNI share for each Santa Fe share. Union 
Pacific then revised its bid and announced an all-shares/all-cash bid of 
$18.50 per Santa Fe share. Although Santa Fe's board announced that 
its financial advisors considered the latest Union Pacific offer fair, the 
board recommended that its shareholders not accept the offer. Santa Fe 
and BNI then completed their joint tender offer and the Santa Fe 
shareholders approved the merger with BNI in February of 1995.104 
The plaintiff shareholders of Santa Fe claimed that the Santa Fe 
directors had breached their Revlon duties by not auctioning the 
company. 105 The Court of Chancery, however, rejected the claim, 
stating t'1at: 
Although "Revlon duties" will attach when a "corporation initiates an active 
bidding process seeking to sell itself," Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290, where the 
favored transaction does not involve a change of control, a disinterested, 
independent board of directors has the "prerogative ... to resist a third party's 
103. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp., Shareholder Litig. No. 13587, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
70 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1995), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. I 995). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at *15. 
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unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer." In those circumstances a board may, 
consistent with its fiduciary dutiesl,; prefer a preexisting transaction without 
becoming subject to Revlon duties. 1 
The Court of Chancery noted that, although an active bidding process 
existed for Santa Fe, such process had not been initiated by Santa 
Fe. 107 The Court of Chancery also upheld a $50 million termination 
fee and $10 million expense reimbursement provision on a more than 
$3.5 billion transaction and certain other transaction protection mecha-
nisms against a Unocal challenge. w8 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
Court of Chancery's holding with respect to the Revlon claim, noting 
that: "While the Board properly encouraged Union Pacific to improve its 
offer and may have used the result as leverage against Burlington, the 
Plaintiffs do not allege that the Board at any point decided to pursue a 
transaction which would result in a sale of control of Santa Fe to 
Burlington. Rather, the complaint portrays the Board as firmly 
committed to a stock-for-stock merger with Burlington."109 
8. Mendel 
In Mendel v. Carroll, 110 the Delaware Court of Chancery considered 
an action in which a plaintiff requested the grant of an option to 
purchase shares sufficient to dilute a controlling group of shareholders' 
holdings in order to allow minority shareholders to accept the terms of 
a merger proposal. The Carroll family controlled between 48% and 52% 
of the shares of Katy Industries and through legal agreements had agreed 
among themselves to purchase, but not voluntarily sell, their Katy shares. 
The Carroll family proposed a transaction to the Katy board to purchase 
all non-Carroll Katy shares for $22 per share in cash but advised the 
board that they had no interest in selling their Katy shares. At that time, 
Katy shares were trading at $24. A special committee of the board 
refused the proposal as inadequate, and insisted on $26 per share. 
Offering only up to $24, the Carrolls withdrew the offer. Subsequently, 
the Carrolls offered a new proposal to the Katy board, this time for 
$25.75 per share in cash. Relying on the opinion of their financial 
advisor that the offer was within a range of fairness, the special 
committee, together with the entire board, approved the Carroll proposal 
I 06. Id. at *24 ( citations omitted). 
107. Id. at *25. The reasons for the Supreme Court's reversal and remand of the 
Unocal claim, which were unrelated to the specific lock-ups, are discussed infra in Part 
V.A.2. 
I 08. Id. at *32 n.8. 
109. Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 71. 
110. 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994). 
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as in the best interests of the Katy shareholders. Subsequently, a third 
party bidder emerged offering $29 per share in cash. The Katy board 
then informed the Carrolls that it could no longer endorse their merger 
proposal. Although the $29 proposal foundered, another party proposed 
to purchase all outstanding Katy shares for $28 (which was later adjusted 
down to $27.80) per share in cash. The special committee pursued 
negotiations with this latest suitor. The negotiations included a proposed 
stock option whereby the acquiror would be granted an irrevocable 
option to purchase 1.8 million Katy shares at the merger price along 
with the right, if the merger was not consummated, to put the 1.8 million 
shares to Katy. Over the vehement objections of the Carroll family, the 
special committee continued merger negotiations with the potential 
acquiror; the final stumbling block was the stock option. Finally, the 
Katy board refused to proceed with the merger proposal because their 
Delaware legal counsel was unable to give an opinion as to the legality 
of the stock option. 
The Katy board then considered the following options to enhance 
shareholder value: "(i) a self-tender by Katy; (ii) a Dutch auction for 
Katy shares; and/or (iii) a dividend in excess of $10.00 per share on 
Katy's common stock."111 The board subsequently approved a special 
cash dividend of $14 per common share. Before the dividend was paid, 
however, a suit was brought claiming that the Katy board's acceptance 
of the Carrolls' initial merger proposal invoked Revlon duties and that 
the board was therefore required to accept the subsequent higher bid and 
grant the option in order to break the control of the Carrolls. In refusing 
to order the granting of the option, the Delaware Court of Chancery first 
noted that Delaware law accepts the legitimacy, "albeit in a guarded 
fashion," of a controlling shareholder obtaining a control premium. 112 
The court discussed the possibility that the Carroll offer of $25.75 per 
share could be fair while the higher offer of $27.80 per share could be 
inadequate, based upon the existence of a control premium contained in 
the Carrolls' block of shares. m "The significant fact is that in the 
Carroll Family Merger, the buyers were not buying corporate control ... 
111. Id. at 303. 
112. Id. at 305. 
113. Id. at 304-05. 
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[t]hey already had it."114 Such was not the case with respect to the 
competing bid. According to the court, that: 
was an offer, in effect, to the controlling shareholder to purchase corporate 
control, and to all public shareholders, to purchase the remaining part of the 
company's shares, all at a single price. It distributed the control premium 
evenly over all shares. Because the Pensler proposed $27.80 price was a price 
that contemplated not simply the purchase of non-controlling stock, as did the 
Carroll Family Merger, but complete control over the corporation, it was not 
fairly comparable to the per-share price proposed by the Carroll Group. 1" 
Thus, the plaintiff's argument that the alternative to the Carroll merger 
proposal had to be accepted by the Katy board under the application of 
Revlon duties was rejected by the court. However, the court continued: 
To note that these proposals are fundamentally different does not, of course, 
mean that the board owes fiduciary duties in one instance but not in the other. 
That is not the case . . . . In this circumstance ... the board's duty was to 
respect the rights of the Carroll Family, while assuring that if any transaction 
of the type proposed was to be accomplished, it would be accomplished only 
on terms that were fair to the public shareholders and represented the best 
available terms from their point of view. 116 
The court then compared the duties of the Katy board when confronted 
with the Carroll proposal to those of a board upon the triggering of 
Revlon duties. "[I]f the board were to have approved a proposed cash-
out merger, it would have to bear in mind that the transaction is a final-
stage transaction for the public shareholders. Thus, the time frame for 
analysis ... is immediate value maximization."117 Accordingly, the 
board of directors, if their fiduciary duties will allow, is obligated to 
maximize the minority shareholder's value. Given the fact that a 
controlling shareholder is not required to sell its interest without some 
compelling need to protect the minority shareholder, a board of directors 
may not act against the interests of a majority shareholder. 118 Based 
on the above analysis, the court determined not only that Revlon did not 
require the forced dilution of the Carroll family interest, but that the 
fiduciary duties owed by the Katy board to the Carrolls italicize such 
action. 119 
114. Id. at 305. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 305-06. 
117. Id. at 306. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 307. 
1106 
[VOL. 33: 1077, 1996] Negotiating Business 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
9. Revlon and the Duty of Care 
Going back at least to Barkan, there has been an effort by the 
Delaware Supreme Court to explain Revlon duties as an incarnation of 
the fundamental duties of care and loyalty for specified factual 
circumstances. 120 More recently, Technicolor and Q VC have focused 
on Revlon as an instance of the duty of care----or, more specifically, the 
duty of the board to inform itself of all material information reasonably 
available. The Technicolor opinion points out that the Chancery Court 
had "noted the relevance of Revlon in 'illuminat[ing] the scope of [the] 
board's due care obligations .. .' and implied that the Technicolor 
board's failure to auction the company evidenced a breach of their duty 
of care."121 The supreme court also included the following in a 
footnote in its opinion: 
The Chancellor wrote: " ... the due care theory and the Revlon theory do not 
present two separate legal theories justifying shareholder recovery . . . . [B]oth 
theories reduce to a claim that directors were inadequately informed ( of 
alternatives, or of the consequences of executing a merger and related 
agreements). An auction is a way to get information. A pre- or post-agreement 
market-check mechanism is another, less effective but perhaps less risky, way 
to get information. A 'lock-up' is suspect because it impedes the emergence 
of information in that an alternative buyer that would pay ( or would have paid) 
more is less likely to emerge once such an impediment is in place."122 
In any situation in which Revlon duties are applicable and the board 
chooses not to conduct an auction, it is important to keep accurate 
records of the alternatives considered by the board, the information 
provided to the board regarding those alternatives, and the board's 
consideration of the pros and cons of various means of determining 
whether a particular transaction is the best one available. In effect, the 
board must be able to show that it made informed decisions about how 
to become informed. Accordingly, a record of work done by the board's 
120. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) ("[T]he 
basic teaching of [Revlon and Unocal] is simply that directors must act in accordance 
with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty."). 
121. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 369 (Del. I 993), modified on 
reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (quoting Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
I 99 I WL 111134 at *40 (Del. Ch. June 24, 1991 ), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 634 A.2d 
345 (Del. 1993)). 
122. Id. at 369 n.37 (quoting 1991 WL 111134 at *39-40); see infra Part V for a 
discussion of lock-ups and other transaction protection mechanisms. 
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advisors and by management, as reviewed by the board, is not enough 
unless the court also perceives that the board (and especially the 
independent directors) has taken "an active and direct role in the context 
of a sale of a company from beginning to end."123 This does not mean 
that the board may not delegate negotiation and implementation of a 
transaction to management. However, the board must be prepared to 
defend its decisions based on the quality of the information it received 
and the thoroughness of its consideration of that information. Thus, it 
is important that the directors actively request any additional information 
they believe would be relevant. In addition, directors should probe the 
conclusions presented by their advisors and management and the 
assumptions on which such conclusions are based. The QVC court 
found it significant that certain questions it considered obviously 
important were not asked by the Paramount directors------e.g., whether 
QVC would be able to obtain financing (a condition to the offer that 
affected the application of the "no-shop" provision of the Para-
mountNiacom agreement). The court described what the Paramount 
board should have done: 
Since the Paramount directors had already decided to sell control, they had an 
obligation to continue their search for the best value reasonably available to the 
stockholders. This continuing obligation included the responsibility, at the 
October 24 board meeting and thereafter, to evaluate critically both the QVC 
tender offers and the Paramount/Viacom transaction to determine if: (a) the 
QVC tender offer was, or would continue to be, conditional; (b) the QVC 
tender offer could be improved; ( c) the Viacom tender offer or other aspects of 
the Paramount/Viacom transaction could be improved; (d) each of the respective 
offers would be reasonably likely to come to closure, and under what 
circumstances; (e) other material information was reasonably available for 
consideration by Paramount directors; (t) there were viable and realistic 
alternative courses of action; and (g) the timing constraints could be managed 
so the directors could consider these matters carefully and deliberately. 124 
In contrast, the Time court was favorably impressed by how "Time's 
outside directors met frequently without management, officers or 
directors being present. At the request of the outside directors, corporate 
counsel was present during the board meetings and, from time to time, 
the management directors were asked to leave the board sessions."125 
The above-described cases are evidence that courts are willing to 
immerse themselves in the deliberative process to determine what the 
directors didn't know, and why they didn't know it. The courts have 
123. Id. at 368. 
124. Paramount Communications Inc., v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48-49 
(Del. 1993). 
125. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147-48 (Del. 
1989). 
[VOL. 33: 1077, I 996] Negotiating Business 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
before them the record of the proceedings, the results of discovery, 
deposition and witness testimony, and resulting events. In other words, 
they have the answers, and they are often tempted to pose the questions 
which they believe a reasonable, prudent director should have asked. 
Directors, therefore, should make an effort to manage the deliberative 
process in a way that will ensure that they receive sufficient information 
and have sufficient time to reach a reasoned judgment. However, as the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated in Barkan: 
[T]here is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties. A 
stereotypical approach to the sale and acquisition of corporate control is not to 
be expected in the face of the evolving techniques and financing devices 
employed in today's corporate environment. Rather, a board's actions must be 
evaluated in light of relevant circumstances to determine if they were 
undertaken with due diligence and in good faith. If no breach of duty is found, 
the board's actions are entitled to the protections of the business judgment 
rule. 126 
10. Market Checks 
A market check provides a means of meeting the obligation of the 
seller's board to inform itself with respect to the value of the company 
without entering into a formal auction process. 127 Even where Revlon 
would not be applicable, a market check can assist the board in meeting 
its duty of care in approving a transaction. 
A pre-deal market check can be performed by a company's financial 
advisor by contacting companies that would be likely candidates to 
acquire the company before entering into negotiations with any one 
party. A pre-deal market check does, however, create risks. Rumors 
that the company will be for sale may begin to circulate, which may 
result in pressure to engage in a full-scale auction, regardless of whether 
the board believes that to be the best means of selling the company. On 
the other hand, a pre-deal market check allows a selling company to 
obtain information that could be very useful in subsequent negotiations 
with a particular purchaser. 
The second type of market check, a post-deal market check, allows the 
selling company to complete the negotiations for the sale or merger of 
126. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 ( citations omitted). 
127. See, e.g., id. at 1286 (when only one party has made an offer and the Board 
has "no reliable grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, [Revlon] demands a canvas 
of the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited"). 
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the company and then have the latitude to seek higher bids. The initial 
bidder will most likely demand substantial termination fees and other 
protective mechanisms before agreeing to permit its bid to be shopped 
in this way. 128 If no higher offer results after a reasonable period of 
contacting prospective purchasers, the board will have established a 
strong basis for defeating any argument that it did not meet its fiduciary 
duties in approving the transaction. Even in the absence of efforts to 
contact alternate bidders, a significant period in which bidders are able 
to top an existing offer without triggering burdensome protection 
mechanisms will also allow the board to support its decision to approve 
a transaction. 
V. TRANSACTION PROTECTION MECHANISMS AND 
RELATED MATTERS 
A. General Issues 
1. .(/Revlon Duties Apply 
Acquirors (or both parties, in a merger of equals) often demand that 
the terms of the transaction include specified economic benefits to such 
party in the event a third party disrupts the transaction. In part, this 
reflects a desire to be compensated for the costs involved in pursuing a 
transaction and, in certain circumstances, for the benefits that could have 
been achieved from potential alternative opportunities that were forgone. 
In addition, these provisions function to remove the incentive to use the 
acquiror as a stalking horse for a superior transaction. The terms may 
include cash payments (break-up or termination fees or expense 
reimbursement), lock-up stock options (which permit the optionholder 
to participate with the other stockholders in a third party transaction), 
and options to purchase specified assets of the seller. In addition, an 
acquiror may demand that the transaction agreement be drafted in a 
manner that makes it difficult for the seller to have contacts with a third 
party regarding a potential offer (a "no-shop" provision) or for the seller 
to terminate the agreement to pursue another offer (such right, if it is 
included, is referred to as a "fiduciary out" or "fiduciary termination 
right"). 
Break-up fees and lock-up stock options make it more expensive for 
a third party to compete with the original acquiror. The third party not 
only must pay the stockholders for their shares, but also must bear the 
128. See infra Part V for a discussion of transaction protection mechanisms. 
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cost of the transaction protection devices. This may skew the playing 
field in favor of the original acquiror and has made such devices 
controversial in cases where Revlon duties apply, especially when it 
appears from the magnitude of the total payments that the deterrent 
effect was the primary motivation for such devices and that the seller 
embraced such devices for their deterrent effect. If the original bidder's 
offer is inferior to the third party offer and the total compensation to be 
received by the original bidder in the event of interference is large, a 
court is likely to determine that the playing field has been impermissibly 
skewed in violation of the Revlon duties of the seller's board. The 
Revlon court described the appropriate considerations as follows: 
Such [devices] can entice other bidders to enter a contest for control of the 
corporation, creating an auction for the company and maximizing shareholder 
profit. Current economic conditions in the takeover market are such that a 
"white knight" ... might only enter the bidding for the target company if it 
receives some form of compensation to cover the risks and costs involved .... 
However, while those [devices] which draw bidders into the battle benefit 
shareholders, similar measures which end an active auction and foreclose further 
bidding operate to the shareholders' detriment. 129 
At an appropriate point in an auction, however, even measures which 
end the auction may be appropriate if a substantial benefit is conferred 
on stockholders, after attempts have been made to negotiate with other 
bidders. 130 
QVC contains an extended analysis of the transaction protection 
mechanisms demanded by Viacom and agreed to by Paramount. 131 
QVC makes clear that a board may not, if it enters into a business 
combination agreement that triggers Revlon duties (e.g., for an all-cash 
transaction or a stock-for-stock transaction that would result in a change 
of control), contract away its obligation to meet its fiduciary duties with 
129. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 
1986). 
130. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del. 
1988). 
131. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1993). The analyses by the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court of the lock-ups 
in QVC were criticized in Fraidin & Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 
1739, 1757-64 (I 994), an article applying economic theory to argue that courts should 
enforce virtually all lock-ups. 
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respect to competing offers from other parties. 132 The Delaware 
Supreme Court stated: 
The Paramount defendants contend that they were precluded by certain 
contractual provisions, including the No-Shop Provision, from negotiating with 
QVC or seeking alternatives. Such provisions, whether or not they are 
presumptively valid in the abstract, may not validly define or limit the directors' 
fiduciary duties under Delaware law or prevent the Paramount directors from 
carrying out their fiduciary duties under Delaware law. To the extent such 
provisions are inconsistent with those duties, they are invalid and unenforce-
able. m 
In connection with the September 1994 merger agreement with 
Viacom described in Part IV.B.5, the Paramount board had approved the 
following transaction protection measures: (i) a "no-shop" provision 
which restricted Paramount from soliciting or negotiating a competing 
bid unless a third party made a bona fide bid without any material 
financing contingencies and the Paramount board determined such 
negotiations were necessary to comply with its fiduciary duties to 
shareholders; (ii) a "break-up fee" of $100 million payable upon either 
Paramount terminating the proposed merger agreement as a result of a 
competing transaction, Paramount shareholders not approving the 
transaction, or the Paramount board recommending a competing 
transaction; and (iii) a stock option agreement whereby Viacom would 
have the option to purchase approximately 19.9% of Paramount's 
common stock at $69.14 if the break-up fee was triggered for any 
reason. 134 Further, in addition to there being no "cap" on the stock 
option's value, under the terms of the proposed stock option, Viacom 
would have been permitted to finance the exercise of the option with a 
senior subordinated note, worth approximately $1.6 billion (the "Note 
Feature"), and to require Paramount to pay Viacom an amount in cash 
equal to the spread between the market price of the common stock 
subject to the option and the exercise price of the option (the "Put 
Feature"). 135 Applying enhanced scrutiny, the QVC court concluded 
that, with respect to such measures, "the Paramount directors process 
was not reasonable, and the result achieved for the stockholders was not 
reasonable under the circumstances."136 The supreme court further 
stated: 
When entering into the Original Merger Agreement, and thereafter, the 
Paramount Board clearly gave insufficient attention to the potential consequenc-
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 48 (quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184-85). 
134. Id. at 34. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 49. 
1112 
[VOL. 33: 1077, 1996) Negotiating Business 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
es of the defensive measures demanded by Viacom. The Stock Option 
Agreement had a number of unusual and potentially "draconian" provisions, 
including the Note Feature and the Put Feature. Furthermore, the Termination 
Fee, whether or not unreasonable by itself, clearly made Paramount less 
attractive to other bidders, when coupled with the Stock Option Agreement. 
Finally, the No-Shop Provision inhibited the Paramount Board's ability to 
negotiate with other potential bidders, particularly QVC which had already 
expressed an interest in Paramount. 137 
In footnotes, the supreme court noted that it was not expressing any 
opinion (a) as to "whether a stock option agreement of essentially this 
magnitude, but with a reasonable 'cap' and without the Note and Put 
Features, would be valid or invalid under other circumstances"138 or 
(b) as to "whether certain aspects of the No-Shop Provision here could 
be valid in another context."139 However, the supreme court proceeded 
to point out, "[w]here a board has no reasonable basis upon which to 
judge the adequacy of a contemplated transaction, a no-shop restriction 
gives rise to the inference that the board seeks to forestall competing 
bids."140 Thus, when Revlon duties apply, transaction protection 
mechanisms are likely to be invalidated, unless the mechanisms in 
question can be shown to further the board's sole duty of getting the 
"highest value reasonably attainable" for the shareholders. 141 Although 
the QVC court invalidated certain of the transaction protection mecha-
nisms agreed to by Paramount and Viacom, the holding of the court is 
limited to situations where Revlon duties have been triggered. 142 In 
addition, the QVC court did not say that such mechanisms are inherently 
problematic; rather, the court was critical of certain features of the 
Paramount/Viacom transaction protection mechanisms and of the size of 
the monetary benefits that would have accrued to Viacom. 143 
The QVC court was especially troubled by the fact that the Paramount 
board did not seek to renegotiate the transaction protection mechanisms 
when it might have been possible to do so in connection with the 
137. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
138. Id. at 49 n.19 (citations omitted). 
139. Id. at 49 n.20. 
140. Id. (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989)). 
141. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988) 
( quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at I 82). 
142. QVC, 637 A.2d 34. 
143. Id. 
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renegotiation of other terms of the ParamountNiacom agreement. The 
supreme court stated that: 
Under the circumstances [existing at October 23-24], it should have been clear 
to the Paramount Board that the Stock Option Agreement, coupled with the 
Termination Fee and the No-Shop Clause, were impeding the realization of the 
best value reasonably available to the Paramount stockholders. Nevertheless, 
the Paramount Board made no effort to eliminate or modify these counterpro-
ductive devices, and instead continued to cling to its vision of a strategic 
alliance with Viacom. 144 
In addition, in discussing a later point when the QVC offer exceeded the 
Viacom offer by $1 billion, the supreme court rebuked the directors as 
follows: 
When the Paramount directors met on November 15 to consider QVC's 
increased tender offer, they remained prisoners of their own misconceptions and 
missed opportunities to eliminate the restrictions they had imposed on 
themselves. Yet, it was not "too late" to reconsider negotiating with QVC. 
The circumstances existing on November 15 made it clear that the defensive 
measures, taken as a whole, were problematic: (a) the No-Shop Provision could 
not define or limit their fiduciary duties; (b) the Stock Option Agreement had 
become "draconian"; and (c) the Termination Fee, in context with all the 
circumstances, was similarly deterring the realization of higher bids. 
Nevertheless, the Paramount directors remained paralyzed by their uninformed 
belief that the QVC offer was "illusory." This final opportunity to negotiate on 
the stockholders' behalf and to fulfill their obligation to seek the best value 
reasonably available was thereby squandered. 145 
By their nature, breach of fiduciary duty claims brought against boards 
(whether by hostile bidders or by shareholders) are litigated in expedited 
proceedings on essentially paper records. QVC highlights the importance 
of a board's deliberative process and the need for keen sensitivity to the 
living record created in considering a friendly business combination 
transaction or responding to an unsolicited one. When the record of the 
board's processes creates a favorable impression with the courts, as was 
the case in the Time litigation, the likelihood of the board's decision 
receiving deference is greatly increased. 
2. .if Revlon Duties Do Not Apply 
Even if Revlon duties do not apply, the board's decision to agree to 
transaction protection mechanisms after emergence of a rival bid will 
clearly be subject to enhanced scrutiny under Unocal and Unitrin. 146 
144. Id. at 50. 
145. Id. 
146. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp., Shareholder Litig. No. 13587, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
70, at *24 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1995), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995) 
("[O]nce the board determined to alter the Santa Fe-BNI transaction in response to the 
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Applying Unocal and Unitrin, if the mechanisms employed in the 
transaction are found not to preclude third party offers and not to have 
a coercive effect on stockholders, such mechanisms should be permissi-
ble if "within a range of reasonableness."147 In Santa Fe, the transac-
tion protection mechanisms that the plaintiffs claimed to be a breach of 
the Santa Fe directors' fiduciary duties included the adoption and 
application of a "poison pill" stockholder rights plan by Santa Fe and the 
$50 million termination fee and a $10 million expense reimbursement 
provision in favor of BNI contained in the Santa Fe!BNI merger 
Agreement. 148 The Court of Chancery found that the transaction 
protection mechanisms, particularly the discriminatory use of the poison 
pill, were reasonable, proportionate responses to the threat posed by 
Union Pacific's offer because the mechanisms "preserved the preferred 
BNI merger transaction, but only after first causing Union Pacific to 
offer the highest value that it was willing to pay, and after causing BNI 
to offer value that was either comparable or higher."149 The Court of 
Chancery specifically noted that "[g]iven the magnitude of the transac-
tion in question (over $3.5 billion), nothing alleged in the complaint 
gives rise to a claim that the $50 million termination fee and $10 million 
dollar expense reimbursement provision were not reasonable."150 
unwanted Union Pacific bid, the altered transaction, which included the joint tender offer 
and the repurchase program, became subject to enhanced scrutiny under Unocal. ... "); 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-55 (Del. 1989) (no-
shop clause adopted at the insistence of Warner and share exchange were properly 
subject to Unocal analysis). 
147. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See supra Part IV.A.I, 
for a discussion of Unocal and supra Part IV.A.3, for a discussion of Unitrin. 
148. Santa Fe, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *27. See supra Part IV.B.7, for a 
description of the facts in Santa Fe and holdings of the Court of Chancery and the 
Supreme Court with respect to the Revlon claim in the case. 
149. Id. at *33. 
150. Santa Fe, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *32 n.8. The Supreme Court, after 
holding that the Court of Chancery should not, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, have 
relied on statements contained in the proxy materials distributed to the shareholders of 
Burlington and Santa Fe, concluded that the Court of Chancery had erred in dismissing 
the Unocal claim. Id. at 72. In doing so, the Supreme Court noted that: "This case 
may very well illustrate the difficulty of expeditiously dispensing with claims seeking 
enhanced judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage where the complaint is not completely 
conclusory . . . . Here, there are well pleaded allegations on the Unocal claim. As the 
terminology of enhanced scrutiny implies, boards can expect to be required to justify 
their decisionrnaking, within a range of reasonableness, when they adopt defensive 
measures with implicatins for corporate control. This scrutiny will usually not be 
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The above-cited cases do not, however, make clear whether Unocal 
scrutiny would be applicable to transaction protection mechanisms 
agreed to prior to the emergence of a particular third party bid or 
whether the business judgment rule would apply. If the mechanisms 
result from arm's length bargaining, as would clearly be the case in a 
merger of equals providing parallel protections for each party, it is 
difficult to see why the approval of such mechanisms should be second-
guessed by the courts, absent a failure to act with due care. Whether or 
not transaction protection mechanisms are subject to enhanced scrutiny, 
the requirement of seeking shareholder approval provides a limit on the 
deterrent effect of such mechanisms, especially non-economic provisions 
such as a no-shop or the lack of a fiduciary termination right. 151 
B. Particular Transaction Protection Mechanisms 
This part of the Article describes particular transaction protection 
mechanisms and certain variations in their features. 
Except as specifically noted, the discussion in this part assumes that 
Revlon duties apply to the transaction in question. With respect to each 
mechanism, we have attempted to summarize any specific limits placed 
by courts on its use. In general, however, such limits remain vague and 
are subject to case-by-case review. In addition, as in QVC, one can 
expect the Delaware courts to look at the total package of transaction 
protection mechanisms in determining whether a violation of the board's 
fiduciary duties has occurred. Under QVC, acceptance of such 
mechanisms by the seller must be consistent with the board's sole duty 
of getting the "highest value reasonably attainable" for the shareholders 
by, for example, bringing in a bidder who would not otherwise make an 
satisfied by resting on a defense motion merely attacking the pleadings." Id. See also 
Wells Fargo Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, *18-*20 (Del Ch. 
Jan. 18, I 996). 
151. Note, however, that shareholder approval of a merger will not be deemed to 
provide ratification on the transaction protection mechanisms employed in connection 
with the merger. See Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 67-68, where the Supreme Court refused 
to find ratification because: 
In voting to approve the Santa Fe-Burlington merger, the Santa Fe 
Stockholders were not asked to ratify the Board's unilateral decision to erect 
defensive measures against the Union Pacific offer. The stockholders were 
merely offered a choice between the Burlington Merger and doing nothing. 
The Santa Fe stockholders did not vote in favor of the precise [transaction 
protection] measures under challenge in the complaint. ... 
If, however, a transaction protection mechanism was specifically approved by 
stockholders, it would not constitute "unilateral" action by the directors and Unocal 
would be inapplicable. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) ("A 
Unocal analysis should be used only when a board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder 
approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat"). 
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offer or by causing a bidder to agree to more favorable terms with 
respect to some other aspect of the transaction. 152 In order to create 
a record of the benefit achieved in return for agreeing to transaction 
protection mechanisms, the seller will want to attempt to minimize the 
aggregate potential cost of such mechanisms. In addition, after QVC it 
is probably unwise, if Revlon duties are applicable, to leave uncapped 
the total amount of the monetary benefits that the acquiror may receive. 
The seller's board should be carefully briefed with respect to the 
negotiations with the acquiror regarding such provisions to allow the 
board to make a reasoned judgment in approving any such provisions. 
Counsel for seller should remind the board that, when Revlon duties 
apply, it is not a proper purpose for the seller to attempt to protect the 
transaction from credible third party offers that would be more favorable 
to the seller's stockholders, except to the extent the acquiror's bargaining 
power forces the seller to do so in order to get a "bird in the hand." On 
the other hand, there may be situations where the seller's bargaining 
power will allow the seller to retain its rights to shop the deal, 153 
especially if the seller is willing to agree to appropriate compensation for 
the purchaser if a third party deal is chosen. 
1. Break-Up or Termination Fees and Expense Reimbursement 
Break-up or termination fees vary in two important respects: (a) their 
size and (b) the events that trigger payment. Reimbursement of either 
actual out-of-pocket expenses or a sum certain that approximates such 
expenses is not likely to raise significant issues with the courts. 
Generally speaking, a break-up fee of approximately l %-3% of the 
aggregate transaction value (with the lower range of percentages in large 
transactions and the higher range in small transactions) is likely to be 
deemed reasonable if it results from arm's length bargaining and is not 
supplemented by a lock-up option. In transactions that do not implicate 
Revlon duties, larger amounts should be permitted as a means of 
defending the transaction from interference if they fall within a range of 
reasonableness for that purpose. The seller should seek to locate the 
trigger for payment of a fee on or after board approval of the competing 
152. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1993). 
153. See supra Part IV.B. 10 for a discussion of post-signing market checks. 
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transaction and execution of a definitive agreement, a point when the 
benefits of the second bid to the stockholders will be concrete. 
Typically, the purchaser will request that such fees be payable on 
termination of the agreement to which it is a party. 
2. Lock-Up Stock Options 
The seller may grant the purchaser an option to purchase an agreed 
upon number of shares of common stock at an agreed upon price in the 
event a third party interferes with the transaction. Options to purchase 
shares representing up to 19.9% of the seller's outstanding common 
stock were common prior to QVC and remain common in bank mergers. 
In light of the focus in QVC on the total consideration to be received by 
the purchaser in the event of a third party transaction and the vehemence 
of the court's objection to the lock-up option, recent transactions tend to 
rely on break-up fees and expense reimbursement provisions. 154 
However, there is no reason that an option could not be substituted for 
a break-up fee if the maximum gain on the option is capped at a 
reasonable amount sufficient to assure the purchaser that it is not merely 
a "stalking horse." In transactions that do not implicate Revlon duties, 
greater gain on the options should be permitted as a means of defending 
the transaction from interference, if within a range of reasonableness for 
that purpose. Arguably, even uncapped options may pass muster under 
the Unocal proportionality analysis that could be applied.155 In a 
merger of equals, the quid pro quo of mutual stock options would seem 
to be especially likely to be deemed within a range of reasonableness. 
Typically, the options are exercisable at the deal price. The terms that 
vary among such options include the triggers for exercisability of the 
option. The deterrent effect, from the purchaser's point of view, will be 
increased if the option can be exercised at any time after termination of 
the transaction agreement to which it is a party. However, the seller 
should seek to locate the trigger closer to consummation of the 
competing transaction, at a point when the benefit to the stockholders of 
the second bid will be more concrete and consummation is more certain. 
Another typical trigger is failure to receive stockholder approval after 
being put up for a vote. 
With respect to a third party with a perceived need to employ "pooling 
of interests" accounting, the existence of a stock option lock-up 
arrangement may also carry significant deterrent value. The exercise of 
154. Id. 
155. Unocal, 493 A.2d 946. 
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the option may prevent such third party from using pooling of interests 
accounting. 
3. Voting Lock-Ups with Stockholders 
If a significant portion of the voting securities of the seller are 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of holders, the purchaser 
may demand, as a condition to entering into an acquisition agreement, 
that such persons enter into agreements with the purchaser that "lock up" 
the support of such persons for the transaction. The deterrent effect of 
such arrangements on third party bids will, of course, depend on the 
number of shares locked up and the vote required to approve the 
agreement. Unlike the other mechanisms described in this part, the 
seller is not a party to the voting lock-ups. Nonetheless, even if the 
decision of the individual stockholders to enter into such agreements is 
not directly reviewed by a court, the existence of the voting lock-ups 
will be taken into consideration in the court's review of the transaction 
protection mechanisms as a whole and their effect on third party bids. 
In particular, in evaluating the granting of a stock option lock-up, the 
courts will consider the number of shares subject to voting lock-ups in 
determining whether the stock option lock-up will foreclose further 
bidding. Furthermore, the involvement of the board and management of 
the seller in becoming parties to or procuring such agreements may be 
interpreted by a court as expressing their support for "locking up" the 
deal. As with other transaction protection mechanisms, if it is clear that 
voting lock-ups are being procured at the purchaser-'s request, and that 
the parties to such arrangements entered into them of their own accord 
without pressure from the seller's board, they should not reflect 
negatively on whether the board has fulfilled its fiduciary duties. 
4. No-Shop and Window Shop Provisions 
A "no-shop" provision is a promise not to solicit, encourage, provide 
information to, or otherwise deal with any third parties. The provision 
may or may not be subject to a contractual "fiduciary out" that would 
create automatic exceptions so long as the board determines, in good 
faith after consultation with counsel, that its fiduciary duties require 
otherwise. A "window shop" provision is a promise not to solicit other 
offers, but it permits a board to provide information to a third party and 
otherwise deal with the third party under specified circumstances. Under 
1119 
QVC, a fiduciary out to a no-shop or window shop exists, when Revlon 
duties apply, as a matter of law. 156 However, by including a contractu-
al fiduciary out, the seller's board can avoid the implication that it 
intends to breach its fiduciary duties and is impermissibly favoring one 
bidder. In addition, a contractual provision allows the parties to 
determine the mechanics and timing of the necessary board decisions and 
other procedural matters as to which Delaware law is silent. Some 
acquisition agreements also contain a specific right to terminate the 
agreement if required by the fiduciary duties of the seller's board. Use 
of fiduciary outs and fiduciary termination rights by the seller's board 
are often conditioned upon the third party offer meeting certain criteria 
as to financing or as to the amount by which the third party offer 
exceeds the original offer. 157 
As with other transaction protection mechanisms, no-shop provisions 
are not per se invalid, but must be justified as assisting the board in its 
"obligation to seek the best value reasonably available" for the 
stockholders.158 For example, in litigation challenging the 1986 
merger of Western Air Lines, Inc. and Delta Airlines, Inc., the former 
shareholders of Western claimed that the Western directors had breached 
their duty of care by, among other things, agreeing to a no-shop 
provision instead of taking steps to encourage competitive bidding. 159 
The court, after quoting the above language from QVC, noted that the 
Western board had agreed to the no-shop provision in order to achieve 
greater certainty of closing (weakening of the material adverse change 
156. QVC, 637 A.2d at 48; see discussion supra Part V.A. l. 
157. Query whether a no-shop, with no fiduciary out, but that automatically 
disappears on the occurrence of a shareholder vote with respect to a transaction, could, 
if demanded by the purchaser, be found to be consistent with the fiduciary duties of the 
seller's board under Revlon (assuming all other transaction protection devices are 
reasonable under the circumstances)? What if all the other devices also terminate with 
the vote? In that case, a limited period of great protection and a subsequent period of 
no protection would result. In order to get an agreement with one party, the board 
would be giving up, but only for a time, possible transactions with other parties. The 
auction, if one is to occur, is postponed but not foreclosed. Some indirect support for 
this idea is found in the Unitrin court's testing of the reasonableness of defensive 
measures against the ability of a bidder to conduct a proxy fight. See Part IV.A.3 above. 
If no other bidders seek to derail the vote in favor of the merger, would that be evidence 
that the directors have met their fiduciary duties? Is the result changed if the no-shop 
allows giving specified confidential information to other bidders that meet specified 
criteria (but not to solicit, encourage or negotiate with such bidders prior to the 
shareholder's meeting)? If applied only to other transaction protection mechanisms, but 
not to the no-shop, would a similar time limit allow increased protection until the 
shareholder vote? 
158. QVC, 637 A.2d at 46. 
159. Rand v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26, at *11-* 12 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 6, 1995), aff"d without op., 659 A.2d 228 (Del. 1995). 
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clause in the merger agreement). 160 The court noted that the market 
had already been canvassed and that Delta was the only viable remaining 
prospect and concluded that "Western gained a substantial benefit for its 
stockholders by keeping the only party expressing any interest at the 
table while achieving its own assurances that the transaction would be 
consummated."161 In contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court found the 
no-shop provision contained in the original Viacom/Paramount merger 
agreement unreasonable because it prevented the Paramount board from 
learning the details of competing bids and therefore inhibited their ability 
to negotiate with other bidders at a time when interest was being 
expressed. 162 
Even in transactions in which Revlon duties do not apply, the seller ( or 
the parties in a merger of equals) should negotiate for a fiduciary out to 
any no-shop provision. There are two reasons for this: (1) the facts or 
structure of the transaction may change and Revlon may apply at a later 
time; and (2) the board may wish to avoid creating the perception that 
it will not, under any circumstance, listen to any offers (even if only for 
the information as to the value of the company an offer provides). In 
addition, if the board determines to take defensive action against a third 
party offer, in order to assist it in meeting the first prong of Unocal, the 
board will want to have adequate information as to the threat posed. 163 
The purchaser is often willing to permit the fiduciary out when Revlon 
does not apply. In such cases, the fiduciary out should provide a much 
more narrow exception to the no-shop because the fiduciary duties of the 
board would not require opening up the field to other offers. On the 
other hand, the purchaser may not be willing to include a fiduciary 
termination right in an acquisition agreement when Revlon does not 
apply, believing that this sends the wrong message to possible third 
parties when Delaware law would not require the board to terminate its 
agreement to accept a higher offer. 
160. Id. at *19. 
161. Id. at *19-*20. 
162. QVC, 637 A.2d at 49. 
163. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55. 
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5. Asset Lock-Up Options 
A seller may agree to sell certain of its most valuable assets to an 
acquiror in the event a third party bidder seeks to interfere with a 
negotiated transaction or as a condition to bringing an acquiror into an 
auction. Such agreements, however, have not been popular since the 
mid-1980s due to the difficulty in defending such actions against claims 
that the directors have violated their fiduciary duties under Revlon. 164 
In contrast to the somewhat more measured protective devices discussed 
above, an asset lock-up tends to foreclose other bids completely. 
Accordingly, if Revlon duties apply the use of an asset lock-up must 
confer a substantial benefit upon the shareholders to withstand scrutiny. 
In addition, if the option to purchase such assets provides a bargain 
price, the seller's board may be subject to charges of corporate waste in 
addition to claims that it breached its fiduciary duties. However, 
notwithstanding the holdings of the cases cited above (which involved 
Revlon duties and clear bias in favor of one bidder), if Revlon does not 
apply, it is possible to envision circumstances where, in furtherance of 
a strategic combination, an asset lock-up at fair value resulting from 
arm's length bargaining would be upheld as not being in violation of the 
board's fiduciary duties if adopted in good faith after due care. 
Furthermore, such a lock-up might be able to pass a Unocal proportion-
ality test, if applicable. 
6. Commercial Transactions 
The parties to a merger may decide to enter into commercial 
arrangements, such as sales or distribution contracts or joint venture 
agreements, simultaneously with the execution of a merger agreement. 
Such arrangements are designed to integrate the operations of the two 
entities in order to begin immediately to achieve the synergies associated 
with the merger transaction. To the extent the arrangements survive the 
termination of the merger agreement, they will serve the purpose of 
deterring an unwanted third party bidder who would not want to be 
saddled with long-term agreements with a competitor. Before approving 
such a transaction, the board should determine whether the arrangements 
are defensible as commercially reasonable in their own right. As with 
other potentially preclusive mechanisms, if Revlon duties apply, the size, 
164. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 
(Del. 1986); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); 
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986). 
1122 
[VOL. 33: 1077, I 996] Negotiating Business 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
nature, or importance of the commercial arrangements will determine the 
deterrent effect, which in turn will determine the level of benefit to 
stockholders required. If Revlon does not apply, and the commercial 
arrangements were negotiated at arm's length in furtherance of a 
strategic combination, then the arrangements would be upheld if the 
court finds that they were adopted in good faith after due care and, if 
applicable, that they were able to pass a Unocal proportionality test. 
VI. SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE MERGER AGREEMENT 
The seller will be most concerned about provisions of the merger 
agreement that could allow the purchaser not to close the transaction 
based on events or circumstances that are not within the seller's control. 
The purchaser, on the other hand, will want to make sure that the 
business it acquires is the one it expected. The provisions discussed 
below are among the most heavily negotiated in any merger agreement. 
A. Material Adverse Change Clauses and Related Matters 
Given the fact that parties to a business combination transaction sign 
a merger agreement several months (or longer) prior to the closing of the 
transaction, there is a risk that during such period the seller will lose 
some of its value. A purchaser will seek to condition its obligation to 
consummate the transaction on the absence of a material adverse change 
(MAC) in the seller. MAC clauses are often the subject of intense 
negotiation between the seller and the purchaser. Ideally, the seller 
would like to force the purchaser to accept all risk of such a change. 
Certain merger agreements between parties in the same industry, where 
the purchaser already faces the same business risks as the seller, contain 
no MAC condition or a very limited MAC condition. More typically, 
the parties negotiate a MAC clause that leaves some of the risk with the 
seller. The purchaser would, ideally, prefer to be able to avoid closing 
if, between the signing and the closing of the merger agreement, there 
1s: 
any circumstance, change in, or effect on, the Seller or any subsidiary of the 
Seller that, individually or in the aggregate with all other circumstances, 
changes in, or effects on, the Seller or its subsidiaries: (a) is, or could be, 
materially adverse to the business, operations, assets or liabilities, results of 
operations or the condition (financial or otherwise) of the Seller and its 
subsidiaries taken as a whole or (b) could materially adversely affect the ability 
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of the Purchaser to operate or conduct the business of the Seller in the manner 
in which it is currently operated or conducted by the Seller. 
The seller, on the other hand, will seek to limit the MAC clause in 
several ways. First, the seller will want to remov~ the word "could" in 
clause (b) and any reference to prospects, in order to avoid any 
possibility that the purchaser can get out of the agreement based on its 
subjective view of future events. In addition, the seller may wish to 
remove clause (b) entirely because without the "could" it is merely a 
restatement of what is covered in clause (a). In addition, the type of 
effects covered by clause (b) could include events or circumstances 
relating solely to the purchaser, which should be explicitly excluded. 
Other possible exclusions to ask for are: (1) an exclusion for changes 
that affect the seller's industry as a whole (especially if the purchaser is 
in the same industry), or the economy as a whole; and (2) an exclusion 
for changes resulting from the announcement or consummation of the 
transaction. The latter can be especially important in vertical mergers 
because the customers of the acquired company may be competitors of 
the acquiror. 
A "back-door" MAC condition may be accomplished through the use 
of a "bring-down" condition (that the representations are true as if made 
on the closing date). In the case of an agreement with broad representa-
tions, this would have an effect similar to that of including a MAC 
condition. 
B. Due Diligence Issues 
The seller ( especially if it is a public company) should resist 
provisions that permit the acquiror to forgo closing based on the results 
of any due diligence or similar investigation after the signing of the 
acquisition agreement. In general, the effect of such a provision (unless 
the threshold of problems that would allow the buyer not to close is very 
high) would be to grant the buyer an option to purchase the company. 
The failure of the transaction to close after a definitive agreement has 
been entered into may brand the company as "damaged goods," which, 
at the least, would give significant leverage to the acquiror in any pre-
closing negotiations. 
The seller should also resist any attempt by the acquiror to include a 
so-called "lOb-5 representation" in the acquisition agreement. The name 
"l0b-5 representation" comes from Rule l0b-5 promulgated under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.165 The representation, following the 
165. 17 C.F.R. § 240. !0b-5. 
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general anti-fraud language of Rule l0b-5, provides that the acquisition 
agreement "does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or 
omit to state any material fact necessary to make the statement contained 
herein not misleading." Such a representation broadens the applicability 
of the other representations and does not merely duplicate the rules 
provided by the securities laws with respect to the transfer of corporate 
stock. Mere duplication does not occur because of the prima facie case 
required, and the defenses (including those provided by the applicable 
statutes of limitations) available with respect to the statutory rules differ 
from those applicable by contract. In fact, the seller will usually wish 
to demand language indicating that the buyer has had the opportunity to 
perform due diligence, is satisfied with the results, and, most important-
ly, can refuse to close based only on the untruth of the representations 
and warranties made in the agreement (at signing and, to the extent 
provided in the bring-down condition, again at closing). In addition, the 
seller should seek to include language by which the acquiror explicitly 
acknowledges that it understands that it is not to rely on anything not 
contained within the agreement and related disclosure schedule, even if 
provided to the acquiror during the due diligence investigation. 
However, it is generally appropriate for a seller that is a public company 
to make a representation that its filings with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission "did not, at the time they were filed, contain any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact required to 
be stated therein or necessary in order to make the statements therein, in 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading." 
In effect, the seller is representing that it has complied with duties 
imposed on it by the securities laws as a result of its status as a public 
company. This representation will usually be accompanied by a 
representation that such filings were in proper form and otherwise 
prepared and filed in accordance with the securities laws. 
C. Antitrust Issues 
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act requires parties 
involved in certain types of business combination transactions to supply 
specific information to the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission prior to the consummation of 
1125 
a merger. 166 Such information will be used in determining whether the 
proposed transaction will have any anti-competitive effects that would 
require the transaction to be terminated or restructured. 
Depending on the level of risk that the combined company may be 
required to divest certain assets, the seller may wish to include language 
in the acquisition agreement that binds the purchaser to go through with 
the transaction notwithstanding such requirements (a "hell or high water" 
provision) or that otherwise sets, in advance, a threshold of what the 
purchaser is willing to do. The purchaser may be unwilling to agree to 
a "hell or high water" requirement for fear that, once the regulatory 
authorities know that it has agreed to do anything it takes to complete 
the transaction, the purchaser will lose all of its bargaining power with 
respect to the regulators. 
166. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § !Sa 
(1994). 
1126 
